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Abstract
2018 started with massive protests in Iran, bringing back the
impressions of the so called “Arab Spring” and it’s revolution-
ary impact for the Maghreb states, Syria and Egypt. Many
reports and scientific examinations considered online social
networks (OSN’s) such as Twitter or Facebook to play a criti-
cal role in the opinion making of people behind those protests.
Beside that, there is also evidence for directed manipulation
of opinion with the help of social bots and fake accounts.
So, it is obvious to ask, if there is an attempt to manipulate
the opinion-making process related to the Iranian protest in
OSN by employing social bots, and how such manipulations
will affect the discourse as a whole. Based on a sample of
ca. 900,000 Tweets relating to the topic “Iran” we show, that
there are Twitter profiles, that have to be considered as social
bot accounts. By using text mining methods, we show that
these social bots are responsible for negative sentiment in the
debate. Thereby, we would like to illustrate a detectable effect
of social bots on political discussions on Twitter.
Bias in Political Discussions on Twitter
By now, the existence of social bots in OSN’s is indisputable
(Boshmaf et al. 2011; Boshmaf et al. 2013; Ferrara et al.
2016; Hegelich and Janetzko 2016; Echeverria and Zhou
2017). Moreover, there is plenty of software that allows an
easy control of fake accounts in an automatized way. The
ongoing use of such software is also documented by the
continuous effort of the platform operators to monitor social
bots accounts and their activity (e.g. Twitter audit). Politi-
cal events discussed on Twitter, and the potential influence
that social bots have on these discussions, is a fast growing
research field, because the way people keep themselves in-
formed about politics and cooperate to express their political
opinion is changing. At the same time, these new ways and
forms “facilitate widespread exposure to political falsehood”
(Weeks 2018). Moreover, the “presence” of social bots in
political debates continuously grows since they have been
identified as “the main tools for online astroturf - or fake
grassroots - smear[ing] campaigns during political moments
world wide” (Woolley 2018).
Regarding to the topic “Iran”, a potential bias of politi-
cal discussions and political activism on Twitter and other
OSN’s was discussed before: In 2009, the outcome of the
Iranian presidential elections and the victory of Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad caused nationwide unrests and protests. As
these protests grew, the Iranian government shut down for-
eign news coverage and restricted the use of cell phones,
text-messaging and internet access. Nevertheless, Twitter
and Facebook “became vital tools to relay news and infor-
mation on anti-government protest to the people inside and
outside Iran”1. While Ayatollah Khameini characterized the
influence of Twitter as “deviant” and inappropriate on Ira-
nian domestic affairs2, most of the foreign news coverage
hailed Twitter to be “a new and influential medium for social
movements and international politics” (Burns and Eltham
2009). Beside that, there was already a critical view upon
the influence of OSN’s as “tools” to express political opin-
ion: Reports of ongoing attempts to manipulate the election
or adding fuel to the flames of the following protests, cast
a damning light upon the opportunities of political cyber-
activism.
On the one hand, ’citizen reporters’ found they could
share stories with people around the world in a mat-
ter of minutes. On the other hand, ’trolls’, ’vandals’,
’rats’, ’sock puppets’, and other malicious online actors
sought to spread false reports. The war in the streets
spread to an online war of words. (Carafano 2009)
On the turn of the year 2017-2018, history seemed to have
repeated itself as anti-government protests took place in
more than 80 Iranian cities: Triggered by “economic issues”,
the unrest started on December 30th and went on for al-
most a week until Iran’s Revolutionary Guards intervened
and ended up the “sedition 1396”3. Regarding the political
discussion on Twitter, Donald Trump’s tweets accelerated
the political debate in several hashtags by sympathizing with
the anti-government activists, claiming to “respect peoples
rights” regarding freedom of expression and free internet ac-
cess and by warning the Iranian government that “the world
is watching”. Additionaly one of the tweets stated that it was
“time for a change”4 . In contrast to that, the Iranian leaders
1https://www.counterpunch.org/2009/07/02/iran-networked-
dissent/
2https://www.wired.com/2009/06/tehran-threatens-bloggers-
deviant-news-sites/
3http://edition.cnn.com/2018/01/03/asia/iran-protests-
government-intl/index.html
4https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jan/04/donald-
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blamed the USA and Israel for meddling in its internal af-
fairs:
Khamenei, speaking in the holy city of Qom, accused
the United States and Israel of a “carefully organized”
plot to overthrow Iran’s government. He said “the en-
emy” had started chants against high prices, attracting
Iranian demonstrators.5
Against this background of indications, given that manipu-
lation and bias is very likely in the political debate of the
Iran protest, we analyzed approximately 900,000 tweets to
detect social bots and deduce statistical evidence from their
behavior, proving an influential impact on the specific po-
litical discussion. In our analysis we focused on the dissec-
tion of texts tweeted by social bots, in the context of the
Iran protest. Still, there isn’t so much profound or statisti-
cally firm knowledge on social bots as “influencers” in po-
litical discussions on OSN’s: Surveys in political science of-
ten aim at proving the existence or the overall quantity of
social bots in a specific political discussion as statistical ev-
idence of manipulation. The detection of social bots is per
se a very complicated task, as they are designed to appear as
accounts of human users (Thieltges, Schmidt, and Hegelich
2016). Therefore, research on social bots usually stops at
their uncovering. Assuming that the designed camouflage
of social bots (Abokhodair, Yoo, and McDonald 2015;
Hegelich 2015) is an insurance for a malicious influencer
behind the machines, this decision might be right. But, since
it is very unlikely to uncover the “backers” of social bots,
one can only speculate about a “de-facto” influence or ma-
nipulation.
With our methodological analysis of the political discus-
sion during the start of the protests in Iran, we’d like to ra-
tionalize the scientific discussions about social bots and their
influence upon political debates on Twitter. Hence, we make
the first step on quantifying the different behaviour social
bots have in relation to human users.
Related Work
Analyzing social bots and their potential bias on political de-
bates in OSN’s has become an ever-growing research field in
recent years. Currently, there is significant research on the
impact of social bots relating to political events like elec-
tions: Kollanyi, Howard and Wolley (2016) asserted, that
“political bots” are used to manipulate public opinion and
that they are “deployed” to polarize in “sensitive political
moments”. Their analysis of Twitter hashtags based on the
2016 first U.S. Presidential Debate showed the presence of
political bots in these discussions. Moreover, they found that
human users on Twitter used “more politically neutral” hash-
tags than social bots.
Ferrara et. al (2016) analyzed the 2016 Presidential race
in the USA during three periods, between 16 September and
trump-tweets-iran-protesters-sanctions
5https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/irans-leader-
blames-us-for-unrest-but-says-public-demands-must-
be-answered/2018/01/09/7f1e9fde-f54b-11e7-beb6-
c8d48830c54d story.html?utm term=.f81a0721ae6d
21 October 2016, and concluded, that social bots distorted
the online discussion on Twitter. Their findings suggested,
that the presence of social media bots can indeed nega-
tively affect democratic political discussion rather than
improving it, which in turn can potentially alter public
opinion and endanger the integrity of the Presidential
election.
Shao et al. (2017) researched the spread of misinforma-
tion in the context of the US-Presidential elections on Twit-
ter. They found that it is very likely that social bots are ef-
fectively boosting the viral diffusion, by actively amplifying
claims “in the first few seconds after they are first posted”.
Corresponding to that, the analysis of disinformation and
social bot operations in the run up to the 2017 French Presi-
dential election advanced the hypothesis, “that a black mar-
ket of reusable political disinformation bots may exist”. Fer-
rara (2017) identified the presence of social bots that already
were detected in the US-Presidential elections. They actu-
ally were used “to support alt-right narratives”, then were
shut down “and came back into use in the run up days to the
2017 French presidential election”.
Arnaudo (2017) studied computational propaganda
spread in Brazil by researching the 2014 presidential elec-
tions, the impeachment of former president Dilma Rousseff
and the 2016 municipal elections in Rio de Janeiro. On basis
of Twitter hashtags related to these events and their context,
he analyzed how social bots operated in the discussions. He
found that in the debates around the elections, as well as in
the impeachment discussions, social bots were deployed by
the opponents of the former president Dilma Rousseff.
Forelle et al. (2015) also focused on researching social
bots that have been used to shape the public opinion or
spread political propaganda. By analyzing the users that
retweeted the politicians content, they found that there are
social bots that frequently pretended to be official political
candidates. According to Arnaudo’s study, the social bots
mostly were used by a (radical) opposition party (VP). But
in contrast to the social bots found in the Brazilian context,
social bots in this study were mostly “promoting innocuous
political events” rather “than attacking opponents or spread-
ing misinformation”. However, there is also evidence that
social bots have been used to oppress and disrupt political
debates on Twitter that are critical of the government: Surez-
Serrato et al. (2016) showed in their study on the #YaMe-
Canse hashtag6, “that bots played a critical role in disrupting
online communication about the protest movement”. In con-
trast, there is also research that doubts the influential effects
of social bots on political events and the related discussions:
Murthy et al. (2016) analyzed the interaction of humans and
social bots in the discussions of the UK-general elections in
2015. Their experimental approach, including the use and
observation of social bots, suggested that bots have very lit-
tle effect on the conversation network at all. Nevertheless,
Murthy et al. revealed that “there are economic, social, and
temporal factors that impact how a user of bots can influ-
ence political conversations”. Graham and Ackland (2016)
6#YaMeCance was the most active protest hashtag in the history
of Twitter in Mexico.
argued the malicious intention of social bots in political dis-
cussions: They developed a “normative role” for social bots,
which suggested that they are able to build “bridges between
separate, ideologically homogeneous subnetworks”, expose
“tightly knit clusters of users to alternative viewpoints”, or
bring “about measurable shifts towards deliberative democ-
racy in online discourse.” Taking the above in consideration,
we analyze the effect of social bots in the Iran protests.
Data
The data used were generated via the Twitter streaming-API.
We accessed this API for a period of 24 hours from 30th to
31th December 2017 and searched for the word “Iran” ev-
erywhere in Twitter. Thereby, we aggregated 899,745 tweets
and their metadata.
Detection of Social Bots
Initially, some problems with the definition of social bots
should be illustrated: The term “social bot” indicates an au-
tomated account in an OSN that simulates a human user to
camouflage its robotic nature. Usually, social bots are de-
fined and categorized according to their intentions, as well
as the way they imitate human behaviour (Stieglitz et al.
2017). Another aspect that remains unclear is what level of
automation an account needs to exhibit in order to be de-
fined as social bot. Relating to the content that is posted on
OSN’s, it is quite hard to make a clear judgement, because
human users may use apps like Tweetdeck etc. to spread
their “handcrafted” content automatically (e.g. via Twitter
API). At the same time, one does not need any software to
achieve a high-level automation, e.g. the case that human
user groups generate a mass of posts or tweets in high fre-
quency by employing copy & paste. Besides that, the fraud-
ulent intent could only be assumed, because the specific in-
tention of the users or the “backers” is unknown. Thus, it is
almost impossible to make an undoubted social bot detec-
tion.
In research activities related to social bots two different
detection methods have been developed: Machine learning
and heuristics. In general, the detection with machine learn-
ing methods is based on hand-coded data sets, which are
automatically scanned for patterns. Hence, social bot classi-
fication predicated on machine learning methods often has to
face the problem of similarity: Such systems can only detect
social bots that are similar to the ones on which the classifier
was trained.
On the other hand, heuristic approaches deal with theo-
retical deduced detection rules, that separates humans from
bot. The drawback of this method is the rigidity of the rules:
Systems that detect social bots by employing heuristic rules
often lack an improvement. Moreover, it is very hard to iden-
tify rules that will work for the detection of specific social
bots. In addition, the combination of different rules leads
to interdependencies that may affect the detection process
in general. In the case of our data-set of tweets and meta-
data we chose a heuristic approach for the detection of so-
cial bots. This methodological decision was based on two
crucial facts: 1. It is not clear that human coding is a gold
standard for training data. The better the camouflage of the
social bots, the harder it will be for humans to differentiate
between bot and human user. There are approaches report-
ing the inter-coder-reliability (Varol et al. 2017), but these
approaches only tell us how likely it is that different humans
came up with the same classification. This does not rule out
that there is a class of bots that is systematically overseen
by human coders. 2. The successful machine learning ap-
proaches all include many variables that are taken from the
meta-data of the tweets and thereby are invisible for human
coders.
For our detection analysis we used four different heuris-
tics:
1. Analysis of the Source
There is a note in the metadata of every tweet, whether
it has been sent via the Twitter app or any other app that
connects via the Twitter API. Our analysis of this source
variable unveiled 97 “suspicious” app services that con-
nects via Twitter API within the Iran data set. Some of
these apps are well-known services for the automated ac-
cess to Twitter, used also by respectable and reliable ac-
counts (e.g. IFTTT). To some extent, obvious social bot
software (e.g. twittbot) or rather dubious sources were
found (www.AgendaofEvil.com, pipes.cyberguerril.org or
www.rightstreem.com). There are also alternative Twitter
apps and media channels found as sources. It is uncertain
though, if these source can be used for running social bots.
Overall, 24,718 Tweets have been sent using such sources.
2. Friend-Follower-Ratio
The friend-follower-ration is one of the most interesting
heuristic relating to Twitter: In the past social bots used to
have an above average friends rate and very few followers of
their own (Wang 2010). The idea of most of the bot-herders
was to have as many friends as possible and therefore spread
the bot content as fast and as wide as possible. With this
in mind, Twitter started monitoring the so called “aggres-
sive following and follow churn (repeatedly following and
unfollowing large numbers of other accounts)”. Every ac-
count on Twitter is now limited to follow 5000 accounts
in total. There is the possibility of exceeding this limit, by
fulfilling an extra hidden criterion: Twitter checks the fol-
lowers to following ratio, and decides if someone can fol-
low additional accounts.7 Our research within the field of
social bot detection shows that most social bot accounts on
Twitter nowadays overcame this limitation rule by having
an almost equalized friend-follower-ratio. They manage to
do so, because they connect (make friends and followers
vice versa) themselves with other bots. Nevertheless, there
are human users on Twitter who also have an equalized
friend-follower-ratio by chance. Still, most of the human
Twitter-accounts had an average of approximately 100 fol-
lowers, so we expanded our heuristic rule and just included
those accounts with more than 100 followers and an equal-
7 https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/twitter-
following-rules.
Figure 1: Word clouds from the three categories of classification for tweets
ized friend-follower-ratio. Within this method we identified
58,372 “suspicious” tweets.
3. Number of Tweets per Day
The number of tweets per day posted by a single Twitter-
account is another efficient criterion to classify humans and
social bot-accounts on Twitter: It is a widely held belief that
social bots have a very high activity rate in comparison to
the average human user. But there is no clear definition of a
conspicuous tweet-frequency: One could simply set a spe-
cific peak-value: E.g. Howard and Kollanyi (Howard and
Kollanyi 2016) use a peak-value of 50 tweets per day to
identify social bots. In general though, this procedure tends
to be arbitrary. To get a heuristic rule that is more accurate,
one needs to calculate a critical value. There are two differ-
ent approaches, that are suitable:
1. Calculate the interquartile-range (IQR aka. the interval
between the upper quarter and the median) and multiply the
value by 1.5. This rate is a typical outlier-rate in analytical
statistics (Friedman 2002). All values that are one and a half
times bigger than the IQR have a disproportional range rel-
ative to the median. Regarding our sample this includes all
accounts that tweet more than 54 times a day.
2. A more conservative approach is to take the most active
5 % users as conspicuous. We used this approach for our
sample and calculated a peak-value of 165 tweets per day
as a conspicuous tweet rate. We preferred this approach to
minimize the error rate.
4. Text Duplicates
If text is automatically generated or spread in large quanti-
ties, there is a good chance that identical texts appear. If one
shares or cites a piece of text on Twitter it is usually marked
as a so called “retweet”. If identical texts appear without be-
ing retweeted, this may be an evidence for automated text
duplication. According to our sample the number of identi-
cal or duplicated texts were relatively low (820 tweets).
Combination of Heuristics
When different heuristic rules are used, there is always the
question of the ratio between the single rules: Is it mandatory
that all rules must be fulfilled all the time, or is it enough, if
any rule is fulfilled? As said before, social bots are very dif-
ferent to each other and one could lose detection accuracy,
if only the cases which fulfill all the rules are analyzed. On
the other hand, if any of the rules is suitable to identify a
social bot, one has to deal with the rule-specific error rate.
E.g. if we take our “number of tweets per day” rule at face
value, we have to assume a priori that 5% of the most ac-
tive users are social bots. Against the background of these
“accuracy trade-offs”, we chose to work with a three-step
procedure: First we classified all of the tweets that apply to
any of our rules as “suspicious”. Second, we took all tweets
where at least two different rules applied and labeled these
tweets as “social bots”. In both sets, we sorted out all of
the tweets made by “verified accounts”, which are often me-
dia accounts or news channels. Media accounts on Twitter
could be easily misclassified as bots, because of their high-
frequency tweets and the fact that most of them are autom-
atized. Usually these accounts are verified by Twitter. In a
third step these verified accounts are excluded from the so-
cial bot classification. By combining the heuristics, we fi-
nally got three categories of classification for our tweets: No
bots, Suspicious and Bots.
Figure 2: Co-ocurrance graph for tweets from normal users
Text Mining Methods
In the first step we employed a “bag-of-words”-approach to
analyze the text of the tweets in our sample: It counts the
frequency of single words in every single tweet and displays
the result as a word-cloud: The bigger a word is displayed
in the word-cloud, the higher its frequency. Figure 1 shows
the three different word-clouds for our three different cat-
egories of tweets (No Bots, Suspicious, Bots). A high fre-
quency for a specific word in a huge mass of different doc-
uments doesn’t mean that this word is very significant to a
specific document. On the contrary, single words that could
be found very frequently in one specific document are very
often significant for this document. To avoid this problem
of simple frequency distributions we employed the “term
frequency-inverse document frequency” (TFIDF) distribu-
tion on our sample (Aizawa 2003). Before employing our
”bag-of-words” approach, we removed standard stop-words
as English articles as well as the term ”Iran”. Furthermore,
we pruned the vocabulary of words, by taking into consid-
eration only words that appear at least in 1% and at most in
45% of the documents. Pruning the vocabulary has a signifi-
cant impact in the accurate context recognition of documents
(Madsen et al. 2004).
In a second step, we analyzed the words that frequently
“co-occure” with each other to determine, if the same words
optionally were used in different contexts. We created a
term-co-occurrence matrix calculating the likelihood that
two words appear in the same context. The context was de-
fined as a skipping window of 5 words. For our three dif-
ferent categories of tweets we sort out the 20 most frequent
words and displayed the 5 words that were most commonly
used in the same context. The results of this procedure are
displayed in three different figures (see Figure 2, 3, 4).
Figure 3: Co-ocurrance graph for tweets from accounts iden-
tified as suspicious
Figure 4: Co-ocurrance graph for tweets from accounts iden-
tified as bots
Screen Name Tweets per Day Follower Friends Source
Davewellwisher 1082 27374 15854 IFTTT
TinaOrt79591465 291 7492 7841 Twitter for Android
americanshomer 310 5636 5669 Twitter for iPhone
BetigulCeylan 231 2394 2277 Twitter for iPhone
zyiteblog 633 1688 3687 Hootsuite
ErengwaM 269 1177 1200 Twitter for Android
PeggyRuppe 230 6424 6347 Twitter for iPhone
sturm tracey 234 2058 2105 Twitter Lite
CityofInvestmnt 97 5180 5017 IFTTT
emet news press 519 14137 3304 Hootsuite
favoriteauntssi 476 5045 5166 Twitter for iPhone
Sakpol SE 442 4605 0 Sakpol Magic
dreamedofdust 626 2640 84 IFTTT
NarrendraM 2034 1952 251 IFTTT
YMcglaun 207 10571 10559 Twitter for Android
lynn weiser 406 20009 19756 Twitter for iPhone
AngelaKorras 194 3666 3768 Echofon
MarjanFa1 262 6183 6059 Twitter for Android
RichGossger 355 587 571 Twitter Web Client
sness5561 ness 451 11994 12477 Twitter for iPhone
Table 1: Top 20 of the most active accounts that were classified as bots. The column tweets per day is rounded to the nearest
integer and the source column represents the source extracted from the url
In a third step we employed sentiment analysis on all
the tweets in our three categories: All words in every sin-
gle tweet were compared with a dictionary8, that identifies
if every single word is rather used in a positive or negative
way. Corresponding to the findings of the dictionary, every
word is assigned to a positive or negative value. Adding
up all the values from the words that constitutes a tweet,
shows if the tweet has rather a positive or negative senti-
ment. Although more complex sentiment analysis methods
exist, we preferred this simple straightforward one, as its
efficiency in Twitter is proven (Kouloumpis, Wilson, and
Moore 2011). Due to the fact that an English dictionary was
applied, the sentiment analysis does not consider any other
languages. Finally, we analyzed if the different outcomes of
our sentiment analysis were random or not: By reviewing
the sentiment of all words in our different categories with
the Kolgomorov-Smirnov-Test (KS-test): The null hypothe-
sis is here, that all of the data is part of the same distribution
function.
Findings
From the total number of tweets, we identified 781,674
tweets that came from human users (86.87%), 118,071
from “Suspicious”-tweets (13.12%) and 10,126 from “Bot”-
tweets (1,12%). The ”Bot” tweets percentage is included in
the ”Suspicious” tweets, according to the methdology ex-
plained in the Combination of Heuristics subsection.
Table 1 gives a clearer picture of the kinds of accounts that
were identified. It shows the 20 most active users in the col-
lection of tweets that were classified as Bots. The tweet per
day illustrates that they are very active accounts that differ
8https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/qdap/index.html
from the normal users. Moreover, for most of the accounts,
the number of followers and friends is very similar. From
the 20 accounts, only the user Sakpol SE identifies itself as
a Bot in its profile description.
On the text mining side, we observed that the bag-of-
words analysis and the word clouds for the “No Bots”, the
“Supicious” and the “Bots” classified tweets didn’t come up
with wide differences: Indeed, the word “Trump” seemed to
be more frequent in the tweets of the “Bots”-group. Further-
more, in the tweets generated by humans we can identify a
higher use of persian vocabulary in the word clouds. Apart
from these cases, the used words and their frequency in our
three categories of tweets showed only narrow differences.
Most of the words are related to the Iran protests, as well as
U.S. Politicians, CIA, and news media.
The results of “co-occurence”-test showed some differ-
ences between the three categories of tweets and a signifi-
cant amount of similarity as well: As shown in all figures
(see Figure 2, 3 and 4) there is a distinct connection be-
tween “Obama” and “Hezbollah”, so the topic of blaming
Obama was present among real users as well as among bots.
The results of the “Bots”-group shows that there is a ten-
dency for economic topics and that the “Trump”-topic has
a much higher significance compared with the “No Bots”
and the “Suspicious”-groups. The hashtag #MAGA (Make
America Great Again) also appears in the “Bots”-tweets.
In contrast to the “Suspicious” and the “Bots”-tweets, the
topic of “Women’s Rights” only occurred in the “No Bots”-
tweets. Overall, our result of the “co-occurence”-analysis
shows, that social bots and human users seem to tweet to
very similar topics. Therefore, the contextual representation
of the protests doesn’t change that much.
But there are significant differences between the tweets
Figure 5: Empirical cumulative density function
of the social bots and the human users: The result of the
sentiment analysis showed, that the social bots used more
negative words in their tweets. The average sentiment of the
“Bots”-group is -0.094. Compared to the “No Bots”-group (-
0.049) and the “Supicious”-group (-0.063) the negative sen-
timent in every single social bot tweet is way higher than
in the tweets of the other groups. Moreover, this result is
not random: The KS-test showed a value of 0.12 and a p-
value of 0.0, which reveals that it is very unlikely that the
words (and their positive and negative sentiment values) are
derived from the same distribution. By looking at the empiri-
cal cumulative density function (Figure 5), one can visualize
these differences: The density function of the social bots has
a distinct characteristic in the negative range.
Conclusion
Social bots have a detectable impact on the atmosphere of
political discussions measured as sentiment. If one follows
the thesis that debates or discussions on Twitter have a polit-
ical effect, and that the atmosphere within social networks
becomes more and more important, then one has to con-
clude, that in the case of Iran protests, social bots have a po-
litical impact. This means, the existence of a measurable dif-
ference between the behavior of bots and humans is a neces-
sary condition for any “bot-effect”: If the bots were just mir-
roring the ongoing debate without any distortion, it would
not be possible to differentiate if humans read the messages
from bots or from other users.
Now, the next step would be to find out, if humans who
read the negative bot-texts change their behavior over time
(and become more negative themselves or are more likely
to leave the debate). Prerequisite for that would be a more
extensive sentiment and text analysis of the tweets, in order
to reveal additional differences of bot-generated tweets and
their context. For example, topic modeling algorithms could
be applied to detect content differences. Moreover, a sub-
jectivity/objectivity analysis could reveal additional features
that could lead to the influence of the public. But this exam-
ination would be beyond the scope of the data used in this
research.
Finally, it should be kept in mind that text mining as a re-
search tool deals with a lot of implicit methodological rules -
e.g. especially in case of the cleaning operations - that raised
some concern about their affection on our results.
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